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Abstract
We study how delivery times and prices for hospital medical devices respond to
the introduction of centralized procurement. Our identification strategy leverages a
legislative change in Italy that mandated centralized purchases for a sub-set of de-
vices. The statutory centralization generated a reduction in prices and an increase
in delivery times for centralized purchases relative to non-centralized purchases. We
use data on quantities and on suppliers to discuss the mechanisms potentially un-
derlying our findings.
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1 Introduction
Previous papers have documented that centralization of procurement has resulted in lower
prices (see, for instance, Bandiera et al., 2009 and Dubois et al., 2021). However, these
lower prices may come at the cost of longer delivery times or lower quality in other
dimensions (see OECD, 2011). If prices fall but delivery times become longer, or quality
somehow decreases, then the overall impact of centralization is ambiguous and may even
be negative.
This paper studies the impact of statutory centralized procurement for hospital med-
ical devices on prices and delivery times. To do so, we collected comprehensive data on
each order of medical devices for 16 hospitals located in the Italian Region Lazio.1
For each order, we have access to detailed information on the type of medical device,
including the brand and exact model. The medical devices in our sample are standardized
and purchased on a regular basis by all hospitals. Like other datasets, such as the one
used by Grennan and Swanson (2020), ours includes information on the unit price paid
for the medical device, the quantity purchased, and the identity of the supplier. Uniquely,
our dataset also provides information on both the order and delivery dates. We define
the delivery time as the difference between the delivery date and the order date.2
Our identification strategy takes advantage of the staggered implementation of statu-
tory centralization for different medical devices. Starting in 2016, hospitals were required
to buy a sub-set of devices using a central buyer, while other devices could be directly pur-
chased by hospitals. We estimate the impact of statutory centralization using a difference-
in-differences research design, in which we compare changes in prices and delivery times
for centralized devices to the changes for non-centralized devices. This empirical strat-
egy rests on the assumption that centralized and non-centralized devices share a parallel
trend before 2016. We test and do not reject the existence of a common trend between
centralized and non-centralized devices before 2016.
Consistent with the papers mentioned above, we find that centralized procurement
reduces prices. Our main contribution is to document that, as prices decrease, delivery
times increase. Nevertheless, the effect of centralized procurement on delivery times is
relatively small. More specifically, after January 2016, we find a reduction in prices
of approximately 15% and an increase in delivery times of roughly 20% for centralized
devices, compared to non-centralized devices. The average delivery time in the pre-
1In this paper, we define hospitals as all those health units that provide health services. These health
units are of three different types: a) units that provide healthcare services such as services for pathological
addictions, clinics for specialist examinations, home care, assistance, vaccinations, blood tests (Aziende
Sanitarie Locali), b) healthcare facilities where patients can be hospitalized (Aziende Ospedaliere) and
c) hospitals where healthcare services are provided and where the clinical research is carried on (Istituti
per il ricovero e cura a carattere scientifico). From this point forward, we use the term “hospitals” to
indicate all these public buyers.
2Delivery times of medical devices became particularly relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic.
According to ANAC (2020), public buyers in the healthcare sector, when asked, declared that delays in
delivery of medical devices represented 60% of all the issues reported in the procurement process.
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centralization period is 12 days, and this increase in delivery time amounts to a change
of only 2.5 days. To our knowledge, our results are the first in the literature to examine
the effect of centralization on delivery times.
Next, we explore possible mechanisms that could generate our main findings. Although
we investigate several possible mechanisms, our primary focus is on the importance of
contract size. We can thus examine whether the reduction in prices due to centralization
is associated with bulk purchasing. Centralization implies that the demand that otherwise
would have been placed separately by individual hospitals at multiple different suppliers
is pooled and placed with a smaller number of sellers. To explain how we investigate this
mechanism, we first define the difference between contracts and orders.
Contracts are legally binding agreements between buyers and sellers, and orders are
the real transactions between buyers and suppliers at the conditions established in the
contract. These real transactions are registered in the accounting systems. When a
contract C for the supply of Q quantities of a medical device D for a certain period T is
awarded to supplier S, at the time of the award the real transaction between the buyer and
the supplier of quantities Q of medical device D that are auctioned in contract C is not
taking place. Units of the medical device D are effectively purchased when, during time
T , the buyer issues orders O to the supplier S for a certain number of units Q′ <= Q of
the medical device at the conditions established at the time of the award of the contract.
Thus, during time T , there might be several orders associated with one contract.
In this paper, we can match our order-level data with contract-level data provided by
the Italian Anticorruption Authority (ANAC) using the contract identifier. Although we
observe only quantities effectively purchased (Q′) in our orders, and we do not observe the
quantities Q auctioned in the contracts, we can aggregate all quantities Q′ bought in one
or more orders associated with a contract for a particular device D by contract identifier
to construct a measure of contract size. This measure of contract size is a proxy for Q.
We find that the overall contract size, i.e., the quantities in a contract for a particular
device, is 200% larger for centralized devices compared with devices in the control group.
We also find that the monthly quantities ordered by individual hospitals do not change,
whereas the number of suppliers decreases significantly. In addition to generating bulk
discounts, we conjecture that these findings may explain the observed increase in delays,
as the suppliers must execute larger contracts.
Note that our finding that the sizes of individual hospital-device orders are not in-
creasing has implications for the welfare effects of the lengthening of the delivery times.
The increase in delivery times that we document is relatively small, and so we might not
be concerned that hospitals and their patients are being harmed in any way. However,
even a delay of 2 days could have important consequences if it leaves hospitals short of
crucial medical devices. Our finding that the monthly demand by individual hospitals for
centralized devices does not increase implies that one of two things must be true. Either
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hospitals were ordering too many quantities of medical devices at each order before the
policy change so that they did not use all of their stock prior to the receipt of the next
shipment, or they are now experiencing shortages.
Finally, we assess the robustness of our results by repeating our analysis in a larger
sample of medical devices that are less homogeneous. Our main conclusions are un-
changed: centralized procurement generates a reduction in price with a small increase in
delivery time.
This paper relates to the literature on centralized procurement (Bandiera et al., 2009;
Albano and Sparro, 2010; Schotanus et al., 2011; Walker et al., 2013; Baldi and Vannoni,
2017; Castellani et al., 2018; Ferraresi et al., 2021; Dubois et al., 2021; Lotti and Spagnolo,
2021). Bandiera et al. (2009) and Dubois et al. (2021) empirically show that centralized
procurement reduces prices, while Lotti and Spagnolo, 2021 show that the effect of cen-
tralized procurement on prices might be larger, due to spillovers to the purchases of items
not subject to centralized procurement. Baldi and Vannoni (2017) and Ferraresi et al.
(2021) look specifically at public procurement in healthcare. Ferraresi et al. (2021), in
particular, show that aggregate expenses of local public health units in Italy decreased
after the creation of local procurement agencies that aggregate the demand of local public
health units. Relative to these papers, we study the impact of centralization not only on
prices, but also on the execution of contracts by exploiting the availability of the actual
orders and delivery times to hospitals.
Our paper also contributes to the broader literature examining procurement in health-
care. Grennan (2013) documents that measures aimed at decreasing hospital costs, such
as increased transparency or centralized procurement, are not always effective. The ef-
fectiveness of these policies depends on the extent to which they soften competition and
the bargaining ability of hospitals. Grennan and Swanson (2020) study whether improv-
ing the information available to hospitals (the buyers) may be helpful in lowering prices.
Whereas these articles consider a setting where prices are negotiated between US hospi-
tals and suppliers (business-to-business transactions), we apply the analysis to a set of
public hospitals (business-to-government transactions). Furthermore, the main focus of
these papers is on prices and not on delivery times.
Bucciol et al. (2020) show that the impact of reference price policies depends on
the bargaining ability of public hospitals. Reference prices could only slightly decrease
public expenditure: efficient hospitals pay higher prices when the reference prices are in
place, and inefficient hospitals can instead pay lower prices. Thus, the policy might not
be effective and could have unintended consequences driven by the demand side of the
market. In this paper, we analyze a different policy aimed at reducing prices paid for
medical devices, and we look at mechanisms underlying our results on both the demand
and supply sides of the market.
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The paper also relates to the literature analyzing the impact of pricing policies on
dimensions other than prices. Maini and Pammolli (2020) point out that international
reference pricing policies in the market for drugs may be a deterrent to entry. Similarly,
we analyze the impact of a different pricing policy in healthcare not only on prices but
also on delivery times.
This paper contributes to the literature that examines the role of discretion in public
procurement (see, for instance, Coviello et al., 2018, Decarolis et al., 2020a and Bandiera
et al., 2020). It reinforces the findings of that literature by showing that limiting discretion
in procurement might reduce procurement prices but might increase delays in the delivery
of public goods.
Finally, this paper relates to the literature on ex-post procurement performance (Coviello
et al., 2018; Giuffrida and Rovigatti, 2019; Decarolis et al., 2020b, Decarolis and Palumbo,
2015). Whereas those papers focus on public works and services, we focus on the delivery
of homogeneous goods in the healthcare sector.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the legislative background.
Section 3 presents the data. In section 4 we present the identification strategy and the
main difference-in-differences results. Section 5 discusses some of the possible mechanisms
behind the decrease in prices and increased delivery times following the mandatory cen-
tralization of procurement. Section 6 shows that the increase in delivery times following
the centralization policy also applies to all other macro-categories of goods that are not
necessarily homogeneous. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Centralization of purchasing
According to Consip, the Italian national procurement agency, more than 35,000 contract-
ing authorities can autonomously award contracts for goods, services, or public works in
Italy. The resulting price dispersion incentivized the Italian government to implement
reforms in the public procurement sector to reduce the number of contracting authorities.
Law 66/2014 (Decreto Legge 66/2014 ) established a list of demand aggregators (Soggetti
Aggregatori) that can award contracts for goods and services on behalf of local public
administrations, thus acting as contracting authorities. Since 2014, there have been 35
demand aggregators in Italy recognized by law. These demand aggregators are a) Consip
as the national procurement agency, b) 21 regional procurement agencies, c) nine mu-
nicipalities, and d) one province.3 Although the list of demand aggregators was publicly
released in 2014, it was not clear for which categories of goods and services public ad-
3The entire list is available at: https://www.acquistinretepa.it/opencms/opencms/soggetti_
aggregatori_new/chi_siamo/
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ministrations could use the demand aggregators, so the use of that tool was discretionary
until January 2016.
A decree of the Italian Prime Minister on 24 December 2015, which went into force on
1 January 2016, indicated specific categories of goods and services for which the demand
aggregators must be used as well as the contract value thresholds above which the demand
aggregators must be used. A second decree, written on 11 July 2018 and in force as of
16 July 2018, established additional categories of goods and services for which demand
aggregators must be used along with the contract value threshold above which the demand
aggregators must be used. As our sample period ends in June 2018, we only consider the
effects of the first decree. Both decrees give power to ANAC to not release a contract ID
(Codice Identificativo di Gara) if the public buyer wants to autonomously award a contract
for a good or service subject to the use of demand aggregators and if the contract value
is higher than the contract value threshold for which the use of demand aggregators is
mandatory. This power is waived in cases of emergencies and urgent need.
Figure 1 presents the list of goods that are subject to the use of demand aggregators,
together with the contract value thresholds and the year of the regulation (Dpcm). The
list includes simple devices, such as syringes and needles, dressings, sutures, and gloves,
as well as devices with more technologically advanced components, such as stents, hip
replacements, defibrillators, and pacemakers. Drugs and vaccines are also included. Be-
low the thresholds indicated, public administration bodies are entitled to award contracts
using discretionary procedures such as direct bargaining with one supplier or restricted
procedures. EU contract value thresholds (community thresholds) for stents, hip replace-
ments, defibrillators, and pacemakers are subject to small periodic changes and may be
updated after some time. For public hospitals, the EU threshold was e207, 000 before
January 2016 and increased to e209, 000 after (EU Regulation 2015/2170).4
2.2 The degree of homogeneity of medical devices
Following Bandiera et al. (2009, 2020) we focus our attention on standardized products.
Specifically, we concentrate on homogeneous products such as syringes and needles of
certain loads, dressings of different sizes, and sutures of different gauges.5 For example,
rather than lumping together all syringes, we differentiate between syringes of 10 and 50
ml to avoid measurement error, as our analysis considers the unitary price of the items
as one of the relevant outcomes.
In order to construct our sample of homogeneous products, we exploit the classification
of devices implemented by the National Agency for Regional Health Services (AGENAS).
This governmental agency supports the government and the implementation of its policies
in the healthcare sector through research, monitoring, and evaluation. Their classifications
4https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R2170&from=en
5Bandiera et al. (2009) analyze goods such as laptops, paper, office chairs, and fuel.
5
were released in waves starting in 2012 and helped the ANAC implement other policy
changes, such as reference prices, for a sub-set of homogeneous items.
Figure 1: Goods subject to the use of centralized procurement
Source: Italian national procurement agency (Consip) https://www.consip.it/media/
approfondimenti/consip-nel-sistema-nazionale-degli-acquisti-pubblici. The first column in-
dicates the category of goods, Threshold indicates the contract value above which the use of centralized
procurement is mandatory, and Dpcm indicates the year of the regulation. The document is translated
into English from Italian.
Figure 2 provides an example of six homogeneous classes of devices for syringes and
needles, as classified by AGENAS. The column CODICE CND represents an alphanumeric
classification identifying the specific device. The column DESCRIZIONE contains the
related description of the alphanumeric code, and the column SPECIFICHE TECNICHE
identifies the device and provides the technical specifications. Of the three levels of
homogenization, the most detailed is the one providing the technical specifications of the
device.
Recalling the list in Figure 1, we exclude homogeneous drugs from our analysis because
they have been subject to reference prices since 2014. Stents and hip replacements are
excluded because they are more complex and technologically advanced devices, although
AGENAS classified them in 2012. We exclude defibrillators, pacemakers, incontinence
aids, gloves, and vaccines because they have never been classified. After these exclusions,
our analysis includes syringes, needles, dressings, and sutures in the class of simple and
homogeneous devices. Finally, our analysis will exclude 39 classes of dressings, syringes,
and needles that, since March 2016, have also been subject to the reference prices, given
the possible confounding effect that this additional policy might have on our estimates.
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Figure 2: Excerpt from the list of homogeneous medical devices
Source: National Agency for Regional Health Services (AGENAS) https://www.agenas.gov.it/
images/agenas/ricerca/agenas_ccm_corrente_finalizzata/LEA/beni_servizi/all_8.pdf.
Notes: CODICE CND presents the alphanumeric classification identifying the specific device. The re-
lated description of the alphanumeric code is given in the column DESCRIZIONE, and the column
SPECIFICHE TECNICHE provides the technical specifications for each device.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
Order-level data: the primary data used in this paper come from a unique administra-
tive database, Spending Analysis, which contains the universe of hospital medical device
purchase orders issued by hospitals located in the Italian region of Lazio. Spending Anal-
ysis is maintained by LAZIOcrea S.p.A., a for-profit data company that supports the
region in technical and administrative activities. The region of Lazio granted access to
the data. All orders made by hospitals in the region are automatically recorded. These
data are a key source of spending tracking for auditors employed by the region of Lazio.
The initial data cover 6,696 purchases by 16 hospitals of 50 different medical devices
in the categories of syringes, needles, dressings, and sutures. The sample covers all hos-
pitals in the region between January 2015 and June 2018. For each order, we observe
detailed information on the type of medical device, including the brand and the exact
model within the brand, manufacturer, and their classifications in detailed groups gen-
erated by AGENAS. Our regressions will treat 10- and 20-ml syringes as two different
devices. We also observe the price paid for the medical device, the quantity purchased
by the hospital, and the identity of the suppliers. The data also contain unique hospital
identifiers. However, the data include no information on hospital characteristics (e.g.,
number of beds and doctors).
Delivery data: a key outcome in our analysis is the delivery time. We compute
delivery time as the difference between the delivery date and the order date. While order
dates are included in our order-level data, the exact delivery dates of the purchased items
are collected in a separate dataset that we match using order identifiers. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first paper that considers delivery times in the procurement of
medical devices.
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Contract-level data: we link our order-level data with data on the procurement
contract between hospitals and suppliers. These data are collected by the ANAC. The
data contain contracts with a value above e40,000. The contract value threshold of
e40,000 is the threshold above which the Italian public buyers must report to the ANAC
the details of the procurement contracts.
Our final sample contains data on 3,720 orders.6 These data contain order-level infor-
mation, such as delivery times, quantities ordered, unitary price of the item, and contract-
level information, such as the value of the contract, the number of firms that participated
in the call for tender, and the format of the tender (open or restricted).7
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics. The average (unitary) price is e1.4.
Ordered quantities, on average, are 2,457, and the average time of delivery is 10 days.
Panel B illustrates that the average total value of the contracts is e589,328, and the
average total quantities ordered in each contract are 97,218. The contract-level data
indicate that, on average, two firms compete to provide a medical device, and contracts
are awarded 60% of the time using an open tender.
Table 1: Summary statistics at the order-level (Panel A) and contract-level (Panel B)
VARIABLES Mean SD p10 p50 p90 N
Panel A: Order-level
Unitary price (e) 1.380 1.587 0.180 1.010 3.035 3,720
Quantity 2,457 8,260 72 360 5,300 3,720
Delivery time (days) 10.33 9.901 2 7 20 3,720
Panel B: Contract-level
Value of contract (e) 579,328 1,716,000 50,800 115,000 900,000 94
Total quantities used in the contract 97,218 198,163 1,224 20,250 243,000 94
Firms competing for the contract 2.056 2.060 1 1 5 54
Open auction (0/1) 0.585 0.495 0 1 1 94
Notes. Unitary price is the per unit price provided in the purchase orders (in e). Quantity is the
quantity ordered. Delivery time is the number of days elapsed between the day of the order and the
day of delivery. Open auction is a dummy equal to 1 if the order is associated with a contract awarded
with an open auction. Mean is the average of the variable; SD is the standard deviation of the variable;
p10 is the 10th percentile; p50 is the 50th percentile. p90 is the 90th percentile. N is the number of
observations.
Relationship between contracts and orders: the relationship between contracts
and orders is represented in Figure 2. We present one example of a contract for 75,000
50-ml syringes. The value of the contract is e60,000, and the contract is valid for 6
months from the award date (30 March 2016). Although unitary prices are decided at
the contract-awarding stage, we do not observe them. We also do not observe the total
quantities in the contract.8At the awarding stage, the buyer does not effectively buy the
6In Section 4.3, we repeat our analysis considering all the order-level data, not only those orders
associated with contracts with a value above e40,000.
7For a detailed description of the contract-level data, see Castellani et al. (2018).
8We do not observe contract renegotiations that might imply different unitary prices with respect to
those agreed at the contract-awarding stage
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units of the device that are in the contract. The contract information that we observe are
the contract identifier and the value of the contract.
After 30 March 2016, orders are issued. The orders are purchase requests that are
transferred from a buyer to a supplier. These requests provide the specifics of the requested
medical device and are also stored in the accounting system of the region. The access to
the administrative database gives us order-level information. All information on orders
are observed, such as the date of the order, the characteristics of the medical device, the
unitary price, the quantities ordered, and the contract identifier. We can match the orders
with the related contracts using the contract identifier that we observe in both datasets.
Table 2: Relationship between contracts (left) and orders (right)
Contract for 50 ml syringes:
Duration: 6 months




















Correlation between delivery time and prices: Figure 3 plots the correlation
between delivery times and prices. It illustrates the negative correlation between the
logarithm of delivery times and the logarithm of prices in the pre-centralization period.
The coefficient is -17.83 and is statistically significant at 1%. Prices explain approximately
8% of the variation in delivery times.
4 Empirical strategy and results
As mentioned in the previous section, we run our analysis on medical devices belonging
to the broad categories of syringes, needles, dressings, and sutures. The devices in the
category of syringes, needles, dressings belong to the set of centralized devices, and the
devices in the category of sutures belong to the set of non-centralized devices. Sutures
were excluded from the first decree issued on 24 December 2015, which specified the list
of centralized devices.
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Figure 3: Correlation between unitary prices and delivery times (in log) before January
2016
Notes: R2 = 7.8%, coefficient equal to -17.83, significant at 1% (t-statistic equal to -10.82).
The treatment, i.e., the decree of the Prime Minister issued on 24 December 2015
specifying syringes, needles, and dressings as centralized devices, might not have been
randomly assigned. We take this policy change as exogenous for few reasons. The first
reason is that the purchases of devices that we analyze come from a single Italian region,
while the central government issued the policy change. Thus, the policy is exogenous to
the region. Second, sutures (our non-centralized devices) were already identified in 2012
as devices with a high impact on public expenditure, together with syringes, needles, and
dressings (our group of centralized devices). All these categories were subject to a policy
introducing reference prices in 2012. Surprisingly, compared to the reference price policy
implemented in 2012, sutures were left out by the mandated centralization in January
2016, although both policies aimed at limiting public expenditure in the healthcare sector.
Sutures were then subject to the use of demand aggregators only in July 2018, after the
end of our sample period. As presented in Figure 1, the contract value thresholds above
which the contracts for the procurement of sutures have to be awarded through the use of
demand aggregators since July 2018 are also the same as the one established in the decree
of the Prime Minister issued on 24 December 2015 for syringes, needles, and dressings.
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To estimate the effect of centralization on delivery times and prices, we estimate the
following model:
Ln(Yodcht) = β0 + β1Centralizedd × Postt + β2Centralizedd + β3Postt + β4Ln(Quantity)odcht
+β5Ln(ContractV alue)c + θd + γh + δt + εodcht, (1)
where Yodcht are the unitary price and the days of delivery for order o, of device d, for
contract c in hospital h in quarter t ; Centralized is a dummy equal to 1 for devices subject
to centralization; Post is a dummy equal to 1 if the order is issued after January 2016;
θd are 50 device fixed effects; γh are 16 hospital fixed effects; δt are 14 quarter fixed
effects.9 The estimates also include the log of Qodcht and ContractV aluec, which are the
ordered quantities and the total value of the contract, respectively. In this equation, the
parameter of interest is β1, which can be interpreted as the difference between the change
in the log of the Yodcht in the group of medical devices subject to the centralization policy
and the change in the log of the Yodcht in the group of medical devices not subject to the
centralization policy from before to after January 2016. We cluster standard errors at the
device-hospital level.
Table 3 reports our main results from the estimation of Equation (1). In columns 1
and 4, we report the estimates obtained using our basic difference-in-differences model. In
columns 2 and 5, we include device fixed effects, hospital fixed effects, and time (quarter)
fixed effects. In columns 3 and 6, we include the logarithm of the quantities ordered and
the logarithm of the value of the contract as additional controls.
The estimated coefficient Centralizedd × Postt indicates that centralized devices are
cheaper (columns 1, 2, and 3) but are delivered with a delay relative to controls (columns
4, 5, and 6) after the introduction of mandatory centralized procurement. Specifically,
considering the model with all the controls (columns 3 and 6), centralization causes a
reduction in prices of approximately 15% and an increase in delivery times of roughly
20% for treated devices. The average delivery time in the pre-centralization period is 12
days. Thus, the increase in delivery time amounts to a change of 2.5 days.
Figure 4 captures the dynamic effect of centralization on affected devices relative to




θjCentralizedd ×Quarterj + β4Ln(Quantity)odchj
+β5Ln(ContractV alue)c + θd + γh + δj + εodchj, (2)
9Appendix A.1 shows the categories of devices in the group of centralized devices (Figure A.1) and
in the group of non-centralized devices (Figure A.2).
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Table 3: Difference-in-differences for unitary prices and delivery times
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Post -0.1958 -0.1351* -0.1450** 0.2723*** 0.2064*** 0.1971***









Observations 3,720 3,720 3,720 3,720 3,720 3,720
Device FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 1.012 1.012 1.012 12.09 12.09 12.09
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on the
unitary price of orders and days of delivery (in logs). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders
are issued after the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device
is subject to centralization. SEs are clustered at the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***).
where j are quarters from the reform; Centralized is a dummy for devices centralized; θd
are device fixed effects; γh are hospital effects; δj are quarter effects. The model omits
quarter -1, which we consider as the reference quarter.
The estimated coefficients of the variable Centralizedd×Quarterj are plotted in Fig-
ure 4. As expected, after 2016, unitary prices drop more sharply for devices impacted
by the centralization policy. On the contrary, delivery times rise more for treated de-
vices. Vertical bands indicate that the majority of the lagged effects of centralization are
statistically different from 0.
4.1 No anticipation of the legislative change and parallel trends
From Figure 4, we observe that there is no evidence of anticipatory effects. That is, all but
one of the coefficients of Centralizedd×Quarterj before January 2016 are not statistically
different from 0. The only exception is for the third quarter of 2015, when we estimate
Equation (2) using days of delivery as our outcome. In Table A.1, we report the magnitude
of the coefficients and their standard errors. The lack of statistical significance of most
of the pre-2016 individual coefficients and the high p-value of the joint test indicate that
the parallel trend assumption is not rejected.
The parallel trend assumption is also tested in Table A.2. In this table, the assumption
is tested parametrically in a model where delivery times and prices are regressed on a linear
12
Figure 4: Dynamic effects of centralization on unitary prices and delivery times
time trend (Quarter), a linear time trend interacted with Centralized, and the same set
of fixed effects discussed in Equation (2) in the sample before 2016. The estimated
coefficients of the interaction term are small and not statistically significant, regardless of
the set of fixed effects that we include in our model.
4.2 Non-linear effects of the policy
We look at the effects of centralization at different points of the price and delivery time
distributions. To do so, we estimate a quantile difference-in-differences model. We thus
estimate the following equation:
Qq(Ln(Yodcht)) = β0,q + β1,qCentralizedd × Postt + β2,qCentralizedd + β3,qPostt
+β4,qLn(Quantity)odcht + β5,qLn(ContractV alue)c
+θd + γh + δt + εodcht, (3)
where q is the q-th quantile, with q = 10, ..., 90; Yodcht are prices and days of delivery for
order o, of device d, for contract c, in hospital h in quarter t ; Centralized is a dummy
equal to 1 for devices centralized; Post is a dummy equal to 1 if the order is issued after
January 2016. We also control for the logarithm of quantities ordered and we control for
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the logarithm of the contract value. The model is estimated including device fixed effects
(θd), hospital fixed effects (γh), and quarter fixed effects (δt). The coefficient of interest
is β1,q.
Figure 5 reports the estimates of the coefficient β1,q at each quantile. Results are con-
sistent with the main difference-in-differences estimates, but we observe a stronger effect
of centralization at higher quantiles of the price and delivery times distribution, especially
at the 80th and 90th quantiles. Table A.3 in Appendix A.3 presents the magnitude of the
coefficients and the standard errors.
Figure 5: Estimated coefficient β1,q with a 95% confidence interval for the variable
Centralizedd × Postt. The estimates are obtained from the estimation of Equation (3)
4.3 Robustness checks
We run a series of robustness checks. In Table A.4, we run the same econometric model as
in Equation (1) dropping orders issued in the year 2018. We thus restrict the observations
to one year before and two years after the policy change. The results are similar to our
main estimates.
As we mentioned before, we do not have information on the unit prices at the awarding
stage of a contract. In addition, we are not aware of possible renegotiations of these
contracts. Table A.5 shows the same analysis, but data on prices are collapsed by contract,
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device, hospital, and product code. The effect of centralization on prices is stronger than
our main estimates, and the number of observations is much lower. This result shows that
our main estimates might represent a lower bound of the effect of centralized procurement
on prices.
Table A.6 reports the results for our main difference-in-difference estimation, using
the logarithm of the quantities purchased as an outcome. The effect of centralized pro-
curement on the quantities ordered for the set of centralized devices with respect to the
set of non-centralized devices is not statistically different from 0.
In our main estimates, three categories of medical devices are subject to centralization:
syringes, needles, and dressings. The only devices in the control group are sutures. Table
A.7 shows the effect of the policy on purchases of syringes and needles compared to
purchases of sutures. The results are similar to our main estimates for prices, but a
weaker effect of centralization is observed for delivery times. Table A.8 presents instead
the effect of the policy on purchases of dressings relative to the purchases of sutures. The
results show stronger effects of centralization on both prices and delivery times.
Table A.9 shows the effect of centralization on prices and delivery times, including the
orders associated with contracts whose value is below e40, 000. This estimation has clear
sample selection issues, as the buyers are not obliged to report contracts below e40,000
to the ANAC. We observe a stronger effect of centralization on prices but a weaker effect
on delivery times.
5 Mechanisms driving the decrease in prices and the
increase in delivery times
We now study the different mechanisms that could underlie our results. We propose
several possible mechanisms: a) bulk purchasing, b) increased competition, and c) a
lower number of suppliers serving the same level of demand.
5.1 Bulk purchasing
National and regional procurement agencies typically aggregate the demand of different
buyers (in this case, hospitals), and thus they award contracts for larger quantities. In this
way, the price is reduced. For this reason, the Italian legislation defines these procurement
agencies as demand aggregators (Soggetti Aggregatori). For this mechanism to explain the
results, when we collapse the data at the contract-device level (a contract might involve
the award of different devices), we should find that the quantities of medical devices
auctioned in a contract significantly increase in the group of centralized devices relative
to the group of non-centralized devices after the introduction of mandatory centralization.
Unfortunately, we do not observe quantities Q effectively auctioned in a contract, but only
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the quantities purchased in each order Q′. Nevertheless, we can aggregate all quantities
ordered for a particular device by contract identifier to construct a measure of contract
size. This transformation allows us to examine whether the reduction in prices due to
centralization is associated with bulk purchasing.
Results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Column 1 reports the estimation
results without fixed effects, while column 2 reports the estimation including device fixed
effects. We observe a 200% increase in the quantities purchased per contract in the
treated group with respect to the control group of devices after January 2016, in a model
controlling for device effects.
We want to rule out the possibility that the increase in quantities in contracts for
centralized devices is also accompanied by a change in the monthly demand of hospitals
for these devices. Using our order-level data, i.e., the only data containing quantities
purchased, in columns 3 and 4, we show that the monthly quantities for a particular
device ordered by hospitals do not change. The results are robust to the inclusion of
device, hospital, and month effects.
We conclude that hospitals are not buying more and that bulk purchasing is a driver
of the decrease in prices. Bulk purchasing might also drive the increase in delivery times,
provided that suppliers do not adjust their production capacity. Suppliers execute larger
contracts after the introduction of mandatory centralization.
Table 4: Difference-in-differences for the quantities purchased
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep.Variable Ln(Tot.Q.ContractDevice) Ln(Tot.Q.HospitalMonth)
Centralized×Post 2.5912*** 2.0019*** -0.2821 -0.0800
(0.541) (0.624) (0.257) (0.126)
Centralized 0.2988 0.8664***
(0.414) (0.316)
Post -2.5809*** -2.5011*** 0.2415*
(0.357) (0.495) (0.131)
Observations 182 182 1,474 1,474
Device FE No Yes No Yes
Hospital FE No No No Yes
Time FE No No No Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 56414 56414 8071 8071
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralized procure-
ment on the logarithm of the purchased quantities. Tot.Q.ContractDevice represents the total purchased
quantities associated with the contract. Tot.Q.HospitalMonth represents the total quantities ordered in
a month by an individual hospital. Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after
the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to
centralization. SEs are clustered at the device level (columns 1 and 2) and at the device-hospital level
(columns 3 and 4). Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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5.2 Competition at the contract-awarding stage
We exploit the availability of information at the contract-level to check whether the price
decrease might be driven by tougher competition at the contract-awarding stage. To
this end, we collapse the data at the contract level. We check three main outcomes: a)
the number of participants (not always reported in the data), b) the probability of open
auctions, and c) the value of the contract (in log).
Table 5 presents the results. We find more competition at the awarding stage, with
the number of bidders increasing by approximately one and a half bidders, but the effect
is not significant due to a lower number of observations. We also find that the probability
that contracts are awarded through open auctions increases by approximately 10%. The
increase is about 19% of the probability of open auctions in the treated group before the
policy. Finally, we observe a large increase in the values of contracts awarded. The effect
is not significant, although the magnitude of the effect is large.
Table 5: Difference-in-differences for contract-level outcomes: number of bidders, proba-
bility of competitive awards, and logarithm of contract value
(1) (2) (3)
Dep.Variable Nbr.Bidders OpenAuctions(0/1) Ln(ContractValue)
Centralized×Post 1.4234 0.0979 0.9020
(1.071) (0.243) (0.701)
Centralized -0.7091 -0.2765* -0.7630
(0.546) (0.140) (0.514)
Post 0.5333 -0.1039 -0.9013
(0.868) (0.211) (0.636)
Observations 54 94 94
Device FE No No No
Hospital FE No No No
Time FE No No No
Mean Y Centralized Pre 1.091 0.542 475447
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralized procurement
on number of bidders, probability of competitive awards and log of the value of the contract. Nbr.Bidders
represents the number of bidders in the contract. OpenAuction(0/1) is a dummy equal to 1 if the contract
is awarded through an open auction. Ln(ContractValue is the logarithm of the value of the contract.
Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after the centralization policy. Centralized
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to centralization. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
5.3 Supply concentration
The final mechanism that might explain the significant increase in delays is the degree of
concentration of the supply in a given unit of time. The concentration of the supply, espe-
cially when the demand does not change, means that buyers purchase the same quantities
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and order goods from a lower number of suppliers, making these suppliers more likely to
be capacity constrained in the short period.
To study this mechanism, we analyze the number of orders and the total quantities
purchased per month in each market. These two variables indicate whether there has
been a change in the monthly level of demand for syringes, needles, and dressings with
respect to sutures. At the same time, we investigate the number of suppliers per month.
To prove the hypothesis that there might be an increasing backlog for each supplier, we
should find that demand does not change in a given unit of time, but the number of
suppliers decreases.
Table 6 reports our findings. The number of monthly orders and the total quantities
purchased per month do not change, but we observe a significant decrease in the number
of suppliers in the set of centralized devices relative to the set of non-centralized devices.
The decrease represents approximately 15% of the number of suppliers observed in the
centralized set of devices in the period before the policy change.
Table 6: Difference-in-differences for number of orders, quantities and number of suppliers
per month
(1) (2) (3)
Dep.Variable N.OrdersMonth Ln(Tot.Q.Month) N.SuppliersMonth
Centralized×Post -1.9833 -0.0551 -2.2833***
(7.345) (0.255) (0.777)
Centralized 14.4167** 3.0026*** 11.2500***
(6.685) (0.213) (0.712)
Post -18.5000*** -0.2485 -0.9167***
(4.953) (0.159) (0.287)
Observations 84 84 84
Device FE No No No
Hospital FE No No No
Time FE No No No
Mean Y Centralized Pre 65.42 266343 14.67
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralized procure-
ment on monthly number of orders, monthly total quantities ordered (in log), and number of suppliers.
N.OrdersMonth represents the number of orders per month. Tot.Q.Month represents the total quantities
ordered per month. N.SuppliersMonth represents the number of suppliers per month. Post is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to centralization. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
6 External validity of the main results
The increase in delivery times is verified on a small set of homogeneous devices. Our
original sample represents only 2% of the entire sample. The reduced sample size makes
it difficult to give external validity to the evaluation of pricing policies in healthcare.
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This section investigates whether the main results hold more generally in the entire set
of centralized categories. Figure 1 lists the entire set of centralized medical devices, with
gloves and sutures only centralized after the end of our sample period and thus included in
the control group. To run the estimation, we first match all contract identifiers available
from the ANAC website with the contract identifiers in the purchase order data. We then
keep only those orders associated with a contract.
The main difference with our main specification in Equation (1) relies on the definition
of a device. In our main sample, we use the classification from Figure 2 provided by
AGENAS to identify the devices and their related fixed effects, using key information
from all the three columns. Figure 2 presents, for example, six different devices. When
we estimate the model in Equation (1), we should thus have six fixed effects. Instead, if we
use the more general device identifiers (as we do in this section) to define a device, we are
restricted to the information in the first column of Figure 2. Thus, in the estimation, we
only have two different devices and thus only two device fixed effects (one for the device
with code A01010101 and one for the device with code A010102). In this analysis, each
category of devices is thus less homogeneous, and this aspect might cause measurement
error in our estimates.
Table 7 reports the results for unitary prices. We observe that our main findings also
hold for non-homogeneous devices, with a decrease in unitary prices of approximately
19% in our main specification (column 3). This set of non-homogeneous medical devices
includes even more complex medical devices (pacemakers, stents, prosthesis), drugs, and
vaccines in the treated group. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the average unitary
price is much higher than the one observed in our main sample reported in Table 3. We
observe that the effect of centralization on the delivery times using this larger number
of orders is slightly lower than the one observed in the sample that we use in our main
estimation (14% versus 20%). The results are also robust to the inclusion of device,
hospital, and quarter effects (columns 2 and 5). The results are also robust to the inclusion
of quantities ordered and the value of the contract in the set of controls.
Although the results on unit prices must be taken with caution, the findings in this
section are important in light of the developments of the contract executions for vaccines
against COVID-19 in Europe. Since mid-January, suppliers of vaccines faced production
issues that led them to cut the supply to some European countries. This fact is consistent
with our findings that centralized and, by definition, larger contracts are exposed to
disruptions from the supply side if the contracts are not well designed.
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Table 7: Difference-in-differences for unitary prices and delivery times: the sample in-
cludes all devices in Figure 1, regardless of their degree of homogeneity. The controls are
those devices in Figure 1 which became centralized at the end of our sample period (year
2018).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Post -0.3261 -0.2024 -0.1819* 0.1292** 0.1431*** 0.1424***









Observations 133,395 133,349 133,349 133,395 133,349 133,349
Device FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 234.4 234.4 234.4 10.71 10.71 10.71
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on unitary
prices and delivery times (in logs). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after
the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to
centralization. SEs are clustered at device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
7 Conclusion
We studied the effect of mandatory centralized procurement on prices and delivery times
of hospital medical devices. Our identification strategy leveraged the staggered implemen-
tation of centralized procurement for a sub-set of the medical devices regularly purchased
by the Italian hospitals in our sample. We used a unique dataset on the purchases of
these medical devices. We document that unitary prices decreased, and delivery times
increased for those devices subject to the centralization policy with respect to other un-
affected devices.
We use data on quantities and the identity of suppliers to explore a possible mechanism
that could generate our findings. Although we observe quantities only in our order-level
data, we aggregate all quantities ordered for a particular device by contract identifier
to construct a measure of contract size. We can thus show that the reduction in prices
due to centralization is associated with bulk purchasing. We also find that the monthly
quantities ordered by individual hospitals do not change, while the number of suppliers
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decreases significantly. Assuming that suppliers do not adjust their production capacity,
these findings may explain the increase in delivery times, as the suppliers must execute
larger contracts.
OECD (2011) noted the potential issue of delivery times in centralized procurement,
underlining that “it may be a risky strategy if the winning supplier for some reason finds
itself having delivery problems and is unable to fulfill its obligations”. In particular, the
paper criticizes the approach used by the Italian public procurement agency, which awards
contracts with one single winner taking the entire contract.10 Our results offer a more
complete assessment of the impact of centralization on the procurement of medical de-
vices and confirm the positive impact of centralization on procurement costs with some
effects on delivery times that should be considered in the evaluation of the effectiveness
of centralized procurement policies.
10“The experience of Consip (Italy), which practices a single-supplier approach to centralized pur-
chasing and argues that its prices and other terms, in general, are very competitive, is in line with this
reasoning. On the other hand, a potential drawback of this approach is that it may hinder SMEs from
participating because they lack sufficient production capacity. [...] Framework agreements with multiple
suppliers have the advantage of providing a more reliable sourcing than single-supplier agreements. If one
supplier has delivery problems, there are others to turn to. It also provides a greater product variety due
to the fact that the suppliers’ products are not completely homogeneous – this is a value-enhancing factor,
given the fact that procuring entities may have diversified preferences. Another advantage is that the risk
of a successive market concentration is smaller.”
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Figure A.1: Centralized Figure A.2: Non-centralized
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A.2 Test parallel trend


































DeviceID FE Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 1.009 12.11
P-value Joint Test Pre 2016 Coefficients 0.622 0.430
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the interaction term between Centralized and
a dummy for quarter on the unitary price of orders (column 1) and days of delivery (column 2) in logs.
Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to centralization. P-value Joint
Test Pre 2016 Coefficients is the p-value of the joint test of Q12015×Treatment = Q22015×Treatment =
Q32015 × Treatment. SEs are clustered at the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**),
and 1% (***).
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Table A.2: Test of a common linear trend for unitary prices and delivery times for the
group of centralized and non-centralized devices before January 2016.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Quarter -0.0044 -0.0187 -0.0153 0.0271 0.0177 0.0324









Observations 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,397 1,397
DeviceID FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 1.012 1.012 1.012 12.09 12.09 12.09
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the interaction term between Centralized and a
linear trend (Quarter) on the unitary price of orders (columns 1-3) and days of delivery (columns 4-6) in
logs. Only observations prior to the policy change are included. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the medical device is subject to centralization. SEs are clustered at device-hospital level. Significance
at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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A.3 Robustness






















Device FE Yes Yes
Hospital FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization for
centralized devices Centralized×Post at different quantiles for unitary prices and delivery times (in logs).
Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after the centralization policy. Centralized is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to centralization. The quantile estimation
also includes the same controls as in the main estimates such as the logarithm of the quantities ordered
(Ln(Quantity)and the logarithm of the value of the contract (Ln(ContractValue). SEs are clustered at
the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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Table A.4: Difference-in-differences for unitary prices and delivery times. The first six
months of 2018 are excluded.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Post -0.2048 -0.1448** -0.1519** 0.2394** 0.1977*** 0.1911***









Observations 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308
DeviceID FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 1.012 1.012 1.012 12.09 12.09 12.09
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on unitary
price and days of delivery (in logs). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after
the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to
centralization. SEs are clustered at the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%
(***).
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Table A.5: Difference-in-differences for unitary prices and delivery times: unitary prices
collapsed by contract, device, hospital, and product code
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Post -0.2660 -0.3548*** -0.3073** 0.2723*** 0.2064*** 0.1971***









Observations 484 473 473 3,720 3,720 3,720
Device FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 0.795 0.795 0.795 12.09 12.09 12.09
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on unitary
prices and delivery times (in logs). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after
the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to
centralization. SEs are clustered at the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%
(***).
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Device FE No Yes
Hospital FE No Yes
Time FE No Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 4071 4071
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on quan-
tities ordered (in log). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after the centralization
policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to centralization. SEs
are clustered at the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***).
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Table A.7: Difference-in-differences for unitary prices and delivery times: centralized set
of devices includes syringes and needles only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Post -0.1431 -0.1426* -0.1593* 0.2032** 0.1332 0.1221









Observations 3,023 3,023 3,023 3,023 3,023 3,023
Device FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 0.403 0.403 0.403 13.03 13.03 13.03
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on unitary
price and days of delivery (in logs). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after
the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to
centralization. SEs are clustered at the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%
(***).
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Table A.8: Difference-in-differences for unitary prices and delivery times: centralized set
of devices includes dressings only.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Post -0.2102 -0.1847** -0.2043** 0.3998*** 0.3627*** 0.3586***









Observations 2,284 2,284 2,284 2,284 2,284 2,284
Device FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 2.192 2.192 2.192 10.28 10.28 10.28
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on unitary
price and days of delivery (in logs). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued after
the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject to
centralization. SEs are clustered at the device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%
(***).
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Table A.9: Difference-in-differences for unitary prices and delivery times. Orders associ-
ated with contracts below e40,000 are included.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep.Variable Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Days) Ln(Days) Ln(Days)
Centralized×Post -0.0773 -0.1874*** -0.1901*** 0.1874** 0.1341** 0.1343**









Observations 6,696 6,696 6,696 6,696 6,696 6,696
Device FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mean Y Centralized Pre 0.957 0.957 0.957 11.76 11.76 11.76
Notes: Coefficient (standard error in parentheses) of the effect of mandatory centralization on unitary
price of orders and days of delivery (in logs). Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the orders are issued
after the centralization policy. Centralized is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the medical device is subject
to centralization. SEs are clustered at device-hospital level. Significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1%
(***).
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